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LEGISLATION
Admission to the Bar-Legal Profession-Residence
Requirements for Student Applicants to the Bar
Residence requirements for prospective applicants for admission
to the bar are imposed by most states.' The required period of resi-
dence prior to the examination varies from fifteen months2 to twenty-
five days.3 In addition, from two to four months is usually needed to
grade the examinations. The asserted purpose of a residence period is
to give the state time to determine the moral character of the appli-
cants;4 this determination is said to be the resultant of two processes
1. These requirements are collected in RULEs FOR ADMISSION TO THE BAR (West
Pub. Co. 1963 ed.),-and in ABA, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO
THE BAn, LAW ScHooLs AND BAn ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES
(1962) [hereinafter cited as BAR ADMiSSION REQUmEMENTS].
Two jurisdictions which do not require a residence period are Michigan, BAR AD-
MISSION REQUIREMENTS 29, and the District of Columbia, id. at 28. Some other states,
such as Oregon, id. at 31, and Tennessee, ibid., require only an intent to reside.
Many states also have some type of residence requirements for foreign attorneys.
(E.g., Mississippi requires two years residence, Arizona requires six months, Texas and
California require three months. AM. Jim. 2d DESK BoorK 243 (1962).) These require-
ments should be eliminated, since their avowed purpose is to facilitate determining the
attorney's moral character, and an inquiry at his former place of practice would quickly
yield a more comprehensive report of the attorney's moral character as evidenced by
actual conditions of legal practice over a period of years.
"If a lawyer must be a resident for one year or more prior to applying for comity
admission, it is quite clear that unless he has a substantial income outside of his
practice, he cannot abandon his office and settle down for a year in idleness in order
to establish such a residence. On the other hand, the attorney who does not have a
sufficient practice on which to live can come into the state, get a job of a non-legal
nature and thus fulfill the residence requirement for comity admission. For him the
requirements are not exclusionary and there is nothing to prevent the bar of the state
from being filled up with lawyers whose abilities have not assured them a living
elsewhere from their profession. In other words, the residence restriction has worked
only to exclude the lawyers of better quality while in itself it is in no way a barrier to
the one who has already proven himself professionally incompetent and a failure in
another state." Horack, "Trade Barriers' to Bar Admission, 28 J. Am. JuD. Soc'Y 109,
103 (1944), reprinted in 14 BAn EXAM. 10 (1945).
2. Mississippi requires twelve months residence before filing the application, and the
application must be filed three months before taking the examination. BAR ADMISSION
REQUIREMENTS 29.
3. Iowa. BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 28. The most frequent requirement is six
months. E.g., Arizona, Maine, and Montana. Id. at 27, 29.
4. Horack, supra note 1, at 104. Some states waive residence requirements for war
veterans. Farley, Admission of Attorneys from Other Jurisdictions, 19 BAR EXAM. 227,
237 (1950), reprinted in SuRvEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION: REPORTS OF CONSULTANT
AND THE ADVISORY AND EDITORIAL COMMIrrTEE ON BAR EXAMINATIONS AND REQUIRE-
MENTS FOR ADMISSION TO TIE BAR 151, 164 (1952). Such waiver has been approved by
a committee of the American Bar Association, which at the same time warned against
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-observation and investigation. These requirements obviously pre-
sent the nonresident applicant with the unwelcome choice of either
being denied admission to the state's bar or of undergoing the proba-
ble hardship of residing in the state the required time before
admission. During the waiting period the applicant may have no
income or be forced to accept some nonlegal employment, unless
he happens to find a law firm which will employ him as a law clerk
while his bar admission is pending.5 Residence requirements favor
large law firms, which can afford to employ prospects, over small
firms, which can afford to employ only licensed attorneys. A third
effect is on the legal profession itself. While originally intended to
protect the profession and the public from morally unqualified ap-
plicants, today these requirements serve as protection for established
attorneys who wish to reduce competition.6 A fourth and even more
important objection to residence requirements is that they are con-
trary to our national policy of free movement of persons, goods, and
ideas. That ours is a mobile and fluid society was long ago recognized
by the framers of the Constitution, who embodied in the instrument
itself safeguards for this free movement. Thus we are assured free
movement of interstate commerce and freedom to express our ideas.
Residence requirements discourage free movement of prospective
members of the legal profession; this in turn deprives the excluding
lowering any other requirements. 11 BAR Ex Am. 31, 34 (1942). This indicates that
residence requirements are of little importance in determining fitness of a prospective
applicant to the bar.
5. This gives the resident student a great advantage over the nonresident. Example:
Student A of state X and student B of state Y both seek admission to the bar of state X.
Student A passes the bar and is immediately admitted to practice. Student B, with
excellent qualifications, must first qualify as a resident. But the law firm which he
plans to enter, being in a small rural community, needs an attorney immediately;
despite wanting B very badly the firm cannot wait for him nor can it afford to carry
him. Thus B decides not to enter the bar of state X. Who has benefited from this?
No one, unless it be the person whom the firm selects in place of B. Who has been
injured? (1) B has been deprived of an opportunity to join the law firm of his choice.
(2) The small law firm has been denied a prospect whom it may never be able to
replace. (3) The people of the state, particularly those of the rural community,
have been denied the services which B could have provided them.
6. These requirements show "a distinct leaning toward the protection of the local
student and the local lawyer with much the same effect as is created by ordinary
trade barriers. . . . In so far as the restraints imposed do not depend on capacity
and training nor insure proper character investigation, they serve to protect local
interests from competition, rather than to secure a better quality of legal service."
Horack, supra note 1, at 102.
A more appropriate solution to the problem of economic competition would be for
the profession to stimulate the demand for legal services by alerting the public to the
advantages of legal counsel. See Garrison, The Problem of Overcrowding: A Call for
Imagination, Experimentation and Organization, 16 TENN. L. REv. 658 (1941). See




state's profession and citizenry of youth, vitality, and exposure to new
ideas, all of which are needed to insure progressive development of
the law. Not only are residence requirements contrary to this con-
stitutionally protected national policy of fluidity and mobility, they
may also violate the privileges and immunities clause by unreasonably
discriminating against nonresidents in the admission to the bar of the
state.
7
Several states require prospective bar applicants to register for
admission to the bar soon after entering law school.8 This early
registration forces a student to choose his place of practice long be-
fore he can have sufficient information to make an intelligent choice;
in addition the time period is unnecessarily long for a determination
of moral character. Three years is far more than is needed to investi-
gate the student's background-the National Conference of Bar Ex-
aminers can conduct such an investigation quickly and inexpensively.9
As an observation period, the time is of little value since the student
is neither practicing nor associating with practicing attorneys.10
An even more stringent requirement, typified by the Pennsylvania
provision," requires the registrant to associate with a preceptor when
registering and to serve a six-month preceptorship, at least four
months to be served after he takes the bar examination. This regis-
tration-preceptorship requirement is subject to the same objections
as the registration requirement alone, and the additional requirement
7. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities
of Citizens in the several States." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2. See Blake v. McClung,
172 U.S. 239 (1898). It has been suggested that such a right to a professional
pursuit is guaranteed by this clause. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 552 (No.
3230) (E.D. Pa. 1823). But a more recent case upheld a state requirement that a
person be a resident insurance agent two years before being licensed as an insurance
broker. La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919). If this case is in point it is
suggested that it be reexamined; however, the case may not be pertinent to the present
controversy as the Court did not discuss the question of whether an otherwise qualified
nonresident was being discriminated against. Likewise the Court failed to meet the
issue head-on by discussing any valid reasons for such a requirement, but rather sum-
marily upheld it as a valid exercise of the police power.
8. E.g., Missouri and Ohio. BAR ADmisSION REQuIREENTs 29, 30. A recent article
describes the mechanics and relative success of the registration system as employed
by Florida. Kanner, Dual Character Investigation: At Time of Law School Registration
and Prior to Admission to the Bar, 30 BAR Exm. 60 (1961). Calling this registration
a continuing investigation of the student, the author points out that the law student
intending to practice in Florida must file with the state within 150 days of his
entering law school. The registration form is then converted into an application to take
the bar examination at an appropriate time. The State Board of Examiners may in its
discretion permit late registration at an additional charge of $65.
9. Horack, supra note 1, at 105; Note, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 710, 712 (1950).
10. See Note, 98 U. PA. L. Rlv. 710, 712 (1950), for a criticism of registration
requirements.




of apprenticeship serves as a further barrier to mobility in the legal
profession. It has also been severely criticized on its merits as failing
to serve any good purpose while doing much harm.'2
It has been suggested that registration and residence requirements
should be waived if the applicant can sustain the burden of pro-
ducing evidence to establish his good moral character. 13 However,
an independent investigative service could very probably obtain
more accurate information, as persons would be more likely to give
honest opinions of the applicant to a neutral party than to the appli-
cant himself, and the applicant would be spared his own time and
cost. Other proposed alternatives to a residence requirement are that
the applicant be allowed to associate provisionally with the profession
while under observation and investigation, or that his license be
withheld until the state is satisfied as to his moral character. 4 Once
again it should be said that a true picture of the applicant's character
is unlikely to emerge, as a person under observation can be expected
to be on his best behavior. In addition, it is doubtful if a state, except
in extreme circumstances, would refuse acceptance to an applicant
who has proceeded this far. Further, if it be assumed that observation
in practice is necessary for determining the applicant's moral charac-
ter, it should be applied to residents as well as nonresidents. Pres-
ent requirements, as well as these proposed changes, discriminate
against nonresident students for no good reason.
Since the proper justification for residence requirements is the need
to determine the applicant's moral character, any alternative to those
requirements must satisfy that purpose.' 5 As has been stated before,
the asserted reasons for the waiting period are (1) to observe the
applicant, and (2) to inquire into the applicant's background. Since
no present observation is generally undertaken of resident students,
there is no reason to require it of nonresidents. Even if required of
both, to reiterate, an applicant will be on his best behavior when he
knows he is under observation. Even if observation would prove
useful, the difficulty in observing persons in large metropolitan areas
where they may have few contacts with the community or the legal
profession would greatly lessen its utility.16 This leaves only the
12. See Currie, The Law Practice Clerkship, 24 PA. B.A.Q. 223 (1953).
13. See Note, 98 U. PA. L. REv. 710, 716 (1950).
14. Horack, supra note 1, at 105.
15. A necessary inquiry is just what acts satisfy the requirement of residence. If its
purpose is to be served, then nothing less than full-time living in the state would be
satisfactory. But it is very improbable that the states continually inquire into the
whereabouts of an applicant. Instances have come to this writer's attention of the
requirement being satisfied by an applicant going to a state, getting a post office box,
going back to his home state, and waiting the required time. If residence requirements
can be so easily evaded, this is only one more reason why they should be eliminated.
16. Horack, supra note 1, at 104.
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second asserted reason, the time needed to inquire into the applicant's
background. This can be done conveniently and thoroughly by the
National Conference of Bar Examiners.' 7 There is no need for the
applicant to be within the inquiring state while this investigation
proceeds. He should only be required to make application at least
four weeks before taking the examination. 18 This period would give
the state adequate notice for deciding whether the nonresident stu-
dent is morally qualified to practice within the state; if found not to
be so qualified he could be informed before taking the bar examina-
tion.' 9 No useful purpose is served by requiring an applicant to indi-
cate an intent to reside in the state, either at the time of application
or when taking the examination. The objective of an intent require-
ment could better be accomplished by a requirement that a prac-
titioner maintain residence or an office in the state or forfeit his
license. However, these are not qualifying requirements, but are a
disqualifying procedure and are not of immediate relevance to a
discussion of residence requirements for admission to the bar. A
person is certainly tempted to state an intent to reside whether or
not such intent exists, and any requirement that tempts prevarication
is undesirable. In summary, the residence requirements serve no
useful purpose while placing burdens on applicants, the profession,
and the nation as a whole by restricting freedom of movement. It
is therefore recommended that each state eliminate residence require-
ments for students seeking admission to the bar.20
Corporations-Bylaws-Allocation of Power Between
Shareholders and Directors
The problem of how much power shareholders should have over
corporate bylaws is a major issue in the difficult area of protection
of shareholders from abuses of power by the board of directors. Since
bylaws control the daily operation of a company, an overzealous effort
to protect shareholders may result in the directors' inability to transact
17. Id. at 105.
18. This is only a suggested minimum time limit, and certainly a longer period, if
reasonably necessary to complete an examination of the applicant's moral character,
would be permissible.
19. The propriety of residence requirements was challenged as long as thirty years
ago. Bierer, Admission of Attorneys from Other States, 2 BAR ExAm. 73 (1932).
Although the author was mainly concerned with nonresident attorneys, much of what
was said is apropos of this discussion of nonresident students.
20. See note 1, supra, recommending the abolition of residence requirements for
foreign attorneys.
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business effectively. The American Bar Association Model Business
Corporation Act, on the other hand, has been criticized for its failure
to protect shareholders from the authority of the directors.' The
Model Act goes to the extreme of placing almost complete control over
the corporation in the hands of the directors. The extent of this con-
trol becomes evident when the provision granting directors full power
over the bylaws2 is read in connection with two other sections of the
act. The first of these sections deals with amendments to the articles
of incorporation. Since shareholders are denied any control over the
bylaws, their only protection from arbitrary acts of the board must lie
in the articles of incorporation; but, under the Model Act, amendments
to the articles must be proposed by the board of directors.3 Further-
more, the effect of the secoid provision is to minimize the number of
restrictions on the power of the board which, in order to be effective,
must be included in the articles of incorporation.4 Other restraints
may be placed in the articles;5 however, those who produce the
original charter and bylaws of a corporation will often become its
directors. Prospective directors could propose, as bylaws, restraints
on the board which provide reasonable protection for the shareholders,
but which are subject to later repeal by the board. When these
sections are read together, it becomes obvious that shareholders have
little protection against the board of directors under the Model Act.
Several states have attempted to modify this aspect of the Model
Act by giving the shareholders power to adopt bylaws which are not
subject to amendment or repeal by the board of directors.' Such a
provision should be included in a corporation act intended to protect
1. See, e.g., Harris, The Model Business Corporation Act-Invitation to Irresponsi-
bility?, 50 Nw. U.L. BEv. 1 (1955); Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate
Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 LAw & CoNTEMP. PROB. 193 (1958).
2. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CorP. AcTr § 25 [hereinafter cited as MODEL AcT]: "The
initial by-laws of a corporation shall be adopted by its board of directors. The power
to alter, amend or repeal the by-laws or adopt new by-laws shall be vested in the
board of directors unless reserved to the shareholders by the articles of incorporation."
3. MODEL AcT § 54: "Amendments to the articles of incorporation shall be made in
the following manner: (a) The board of directors shall adopt a resolution setting forth
the proposed amendment .... ." Although the wisdom of this provision may be
open to dispute, its consideration is beyond the scope of this writing.
4. MODEL AcT § 48.
5. MODEL ACr § 25. This liberal provision is, in itself, an admirable attempt to
provide flexibility in corporate charters and to combat the unnecessary formalism
which has resulted from more rigid attempts to prescribe exactly what items must
be placed in the charter and what other items must be included in the bylaws. See,
e.g., Cow v. Consolidated Coppermines Corp., 19 Del. Ch. 172, 165 Atl. 136 (1933),
where it was held that a charter provision fixing the number of directors was not
enforceable, because the statute said that such provisions were to be set forth in the
bylaws.
6. S.C. CODE § 12-16.1(c) (Supp. 1963): "The directors may adopt, amend, or
repeal a bylaw adopted by the shareholders unless such bylaw shall forbid amendment
or repeal or limit the extent to which it may be amended or repealed." North Carolina
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shareholders adequately, since the shareholders thereby receive a
broad and flexible power to correct abuses by the directors. But by-
laws adopted under these statutes will normally be directed against
specific acts of the directors and will be adopted only after these acts
have taken place. Shareholders can hardly be expected to pass a com-
prehensive series of measures designed to prevent types of director
misconduct which have not already manifested themselves. The main
efficacy of these statutes, therefore, lies in correcting problems as they
arise and not in preventing other types of problems which may appear
in the future.
For this reason, a desirable corporation act should include a measure
designed to prevent the more predictable varieties of director miscon-
duct as well as to give shareholders the power to correct other abuses
as they arise. To accomplish this purpose, certain types of bylaws may
be placed beyond the power of the board by a provision of the statute
rather than by a shareholder resolution that the board is to have no
amending power. In determining what types of bylaws should be
placed in this category, two considerations are relevant. First is
that action of the board should be regulated which would
change the allocation of power within the corporation. Such
activities as purchase or sale of treasury or unissued capital stock may
be used to place a majority of voting shares in the hands of the di-
rectors.7 A second consideration is whether the subject dealt with in
a bylaw is traditionally a fertile area for unscrupulous action by direc-
tors. The matter of direct and indirect compensation of directors and
officers is subject to frequent disputes and abuses of power,8 and by-
laws which limit the board's freedom in this area should not be subject
to repeal or amendment by the board. Finally, bylaws establishing
procedural rights of shareholders should not be changed by action of
the board. Section 25 of the Model Act should, therefore, be amended
to read as follows:
goes farther by providing that, in the absence of a specific statement in a shareholder-
adopted bylaw that it is to be subject to the power of the board, the board lacks
power to alter the bylaw. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-16 (1960). Ohio adopts a slightly more
forceful position by terming shareholder-adopted provisions "regulations" and placing
them in a position intermediate between the bylaws and the charter. Orno REV. CODE
ANN. § 1701.11 (Baldwin 1958). For other statutes allowing shareholders to prevent
the directors from repealing bylaws, see CAL. Corn'. CODE § 500; VA. CODE ANN. §
13.1-24 (1956). Missouri takes a position opposite that of the Model Act by vesting
power over the bylaws in the shareholders, except to the extent that such power may
be granted to the directors in the articles. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.290 (1952). Under
this system the incorporators can, as a matter of course, be expected to reserve all
bylaw power to the directors.
7. See, e.g., Dunlay v. Avenue M Garage & Repair Co., 253 N.Y. 274, 170 N.E. 917
(1930); Petre v. Bruce, 157 Tenn. 131, 7 S.W.2d 43 (1928).
8. See, e.g., Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933); Blish v. Thompson Automatic
Arms Corp., 30 Del. Ch. 538, 64 A.2d 581 (1948).
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(a) The bylaws of a corporation may be adopted, amended, or repealed
either by the board of directors or by the shareholders.
(b) A bylaw falling within any of the following categories may be re-
pealed or amended only by the shareholders, except that directors may so
amend the bylaw as to further restrict their authority:
(1) Restrictions on the sale or purchase of unissued stock or of
treasury stock of the corporation. For purposes of this section,
stock of a parent corporation held by another corporation more
than fifty per cent of whose voting stock is owned by the parent
corporation is to be treated as treasury stock.
(2) Any limitations on the authority of the board to compensate
directors, officers, or employees by means of salaries, bonuses,
options to purchase stock, or payments proportioned to earnings
of the corporation.9
(3) Rules granting shareholders options to purchase additional stock
issued by the corporation. 10
(4) Rules establishing procedure by which shareholders may require
a shareholders' meeting, may have access to the books of the
corporation or to its list of shareholders, or may exercise any
other procedural rights which statute, charter, or bylaws may
grant to the shareholders.
(5) Provisions passed by the shareholders which specifically provide
that they are to be beyond the power of the board of directors
to amend or to repeal.
Courts-Administration of Justice-Restricting the
Appellate Jurisdiction of Courts of Last Resort
The great increase in litigation resulting from the growth and in-
creasing complexity of our society has caused a decrease in the per-
centage of cases that can effectively be handled by our state courts
of last resort. Though in practice it may be a difficult process,
theoretically the lower levels of a judicial system may be expanded
to whatever size is necessary to accommodate an increasing burden
of litigation. At the apex of a judicial hierarchy, however, the need
for a single court of final authority' presents a more difficult problem.
9. For another approach to this problem, see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 55-16(a) (3) (1960),
providing that any profit-sharing plan passed by the board of directors will become
void if not ratified within five years by the shareholders.
10. Some statutes require that any rules limiting shareholders' pre-emptive rights be
set forth in the charter. See, e.g., VA. CoDE ANN. § 13.1-49(f) (1956). The broader
language of the proposal in this article is intended to prevent circumvention as well as
direct repeal of pre-emptive rights. For a discussion of the dangers of such circum-
vention, see O'Neal, Arrangements Which Protect Minority Shareholders Against
"Squeeze-Outs," 45 Mnim. L. RFv. 537 (1961).
1. To a limited extent it is possible to have several courts of final authority. Texas,
with its separate courts of last resort for civil and criminal appeals, is a well known
example of such a jurisdiction. Tzx. CoNsT. art. 5, §§ 3, 5.
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One solution has been to create a system of intermediate appellate
courts to make appeals readily available.2 This allows the bulk of
appeals to be finally decided in the intermediate court and permits
restriction of the jurisdiction of the highest court. By limiting the
number of appeals as of right, the highest court may devote its time
to cases of exceptional importance. 3 Among the states which have
adopted this method of alleviating the work load of the highest
court, the extent to which the jurisdiction of the court is limited
varies remarkably. An examination of the jurisdiction of the highest
court in states with an intermediate appellate court4 might suggest a
desirable balance between the need to leave the highest court free
to choose only important cases and the desirability that certain types
of cases be appealable.
In Tennessee5 and Georgia,6 for example, the highest court's appel-
late jurisdiction extends to broad categories of cases, bringing a large
number of direct appeals to the court. Such broad grants not only tend
to nullify the beneficial effects of limiting jurisdiction,7 but also create
2. This is not an exclusive solution and indeed has its critics. The alternative is to
have the highest court operate in divisions. For a good discussion of the merits of the
divisional system, see Sunderland, A Simplified System of Appellate Procedure, 17 TENN.
L. REv. 651, 661-67 (1943), and AmERICAN BAn AsSocIATIoN, REPORTS OF THE
SECTION OF JumIcrAL ADMINISTRATION 104-06 (1938), reprinted in VANERBILT,
Mw NMUM STANDARDS OF JUDiCIAL ADmmISTRATION 600-02 (1949).
3. It was recommended that Florida create an intermediate court of appeals and
severely restrict the jurisdiction of the supreme court "to reserve the time and energies
of the members of that court for the more important cases (i.e., those involving the
death penalty, those involving constitutional questions, those involving questions of
great public importance, and those in which the decision is in conflict with the
decisions of other district courts or of the supreme court itself). Furthermore, the
members of the supreme court will be able to give more deliberate consideration to
these cases than heretofore." Florida Judicial Council, Improving Florida's Court Sys-
tem 32, July 1, 1956, quoted in Wilson & Brodnax, The Florida Appellate Review,
11 FLA. L. REv. 1, 11 (1958). A constitutional amendment, based on this recommenda-
tion, reorganizing Florida's judiciary was later passed. See note 12 infra.
4. Fourteen states have an intermediate appellate court. Am. JusR. 2d, DESK BOOK
198 (1962).
5. Examples of cases which may be appealed to the Supreme Court of Tennessee
are those involving: (1) the constitutionality of a statute or city ordinance; (2) the
right to hold public office; (3) workmen's compensation; (4) state revenue; (5)
mandamus; (6) quo warranto; (7) ouster; (8) matters finally determined in the lower
court on demurrer or in which the facts have been stipulated; and (9) criminal prose-
cutions. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 16-408, 40-3401 (1956).
6. Examples of cases which may be appealed to the Supreme Court of Georgia are:
(1) those involving constitutional questions; (2) those involving title to land; (3)
those involving validity and construction of wills; (4) those involving conviction of
capital felony; (5) all equity cases; (6) all habeas corpus cases; and (7) all divorce
and alimony cases. GA. CONST. art. VI, § 2, para. IV.
7. An examination of the cases printed in volume 208 of the Tennessee Reports
reveals that out of a total of eighty-nine cases, thirteen workmen's compensation and
twenty-six criminal cases were before the court on direct appeal. Only thirteen cases
were in the court on certiorari to the court of appeals.
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confusion as to whether the highest or an intermediate court has
jurisdiction of the appeal.8 On the other hand, the Model State
Judicial Article provides for a high court of very narrow jurisdiction,
allowing compulsory appeals only where the death penalty or im-
prisonment for a period of greater than 25 years has been imposedY
In general there are two methods of designating appeals as of right
to the highest court-some appeals are allowed because of the subject
matter of the case and some are allowed because of the manner of
disposition in the lower courts. Two fairly recent judicial reforms
indicate modem thinking as to the kinds of cases which, because of
their subject matter, should be appealable as of right. In 1958, the
Louisiana constitution was amended 0 to effect an eighty per cent
reduction in the number of cases appealable to that state's supreme
court by confining the court's appellate jurisdiction to cases involving
the following issues: (1) the constitutionality of a tax or assessment;
(2) a lower court finding that a law is unconstitutional; (3) contest
of orders of the Louisiana Public Service Commission; (4) certain
election contests; and (5) possibility of imposition of the death penalty
or imprisonment at hard labor, or actual imposition of a fine exceeding
three hundred dollars or imprisonment exceeding six months. A 1956
Florida constitutional amendment 2 is similar except that the only
criminal cases which the high court must take on appeal are those in
which the death penalty has been imposed. For the most part, the
subject matter of the types of cases singled out for appeal in Louisiana
and Florida involve questions which need to be quickly and finally
determined. Allowing appeals as of right for the kind of cases where,
in the public interest, immediate finality is desirable serves a definite
purpose, will add only slightly to the court's work, and will probably
not be a source of confusion as to jurisdiction.
In addition to allowing appeal as of right because of the subject
matter of the case, some states permit appeals according to the manner
of disposition of the case in the lower court. In both New York13 and
New Jersey' 4 a case may be appealed where there has been a dissent
8. That this can be a continuing problem is indicated by the extensive annotations
in GA. CODE ANN. § 2-3704 (1948, Supp. 1963).
9. AmCAN BAn ASSOCIATION SECTION OF JUDICIAL ADMfINISTRATION, MODEL
JUDICIAL ARTICLE § 2, ff2(B) (1962), reprinted in Holt, The Model State Judicial
Article in Perspective, 47 J. AM. Jun. Soc'Y 6, 9 (1963). Most states also provide for
appeal as of right when the death penalty has been imposed. The basis for this seems
to be tradition. There is no reason why the intermediate court could not adequately
handle such appeals.
10. LA. CONsT. art. 7, § 10.
11. Tucker, Tate & McMahon, Appellate Reorganization in Louisiana, 19 LA. L. REV.
287, 289 (1958).
12. FLA. CONST. art. 5, § 4(2).
13. N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 7(1).
14. N.J. CONST. art. 6, § 5, para. 1(b).
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in the appellate division; in New York an appeal is proper if the
appellate division has reversed or modified the trial court's decision.
The advantages of these objective criteria for selecting appeals are
that where error is presumably more likely because of disagreement
among judges, review can be had even though the case lacks the
"great public importance" required for certiorari, and that providing
objective criteria for granting appeals tends to lessen the criticism
of the mystique that shrouds the granting of certiorari. 15 On the other
hand, allowing these appeals to the highest court has been criticized
as tending to lessen respect for decisions of the intermediate court.1
6
Furthermore, experience has indicated that this exposes the highest
court to many inconsequential appeals.' 7 The latter reasons seem more
substantial than the former. Correction of error should not usually
be the primary concern of the highest court in a tri-level judicial sys-
tem. The task of the intermediate court is to correct error on appeal;
the task of the highest court is to insure uniformity in the law and to
mold and develop the law as it affects the public generally. 8 Ap-
propriately modified for application in a state court the following rule
of the United States Supreme Court describes the kind of case that
the highest court should hear:
Where a court of appeals has rendered a decision in conflict with the de-
cision of another court of appeals on the same matter . .. or has decided an
important question of federal law which has not been, but should be, settled
by this court; or has decided a federal question in a way in conflict with ap-
plicable decisions of this court; or has so far departed from the accepted
and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure
by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of this court's power of super-
vision. 19
There is no need for an arbitrary rule forcing the court to take appeals
because of dissent in .the lower courts; if a case merits review, the
15. For a detailed argument supporting the desirability of these objective criteria,
see Institute of Judicial Administration, Intermediate Appellate Courts 5-7, May 11,
1954.
16. See Note, To Hear or Not To Hear: A Question for the California Supreme Court,
3 STAN. L. REv. 243, 265-68 (1951).
17. See Desmond, The Limited Jurisdiction of the New York Court of Appeals-How
Does It Work?, 2 SYRAcusE L. REv. 1, 7 (1950).
18. Commenting on the United States Supreme Court, Chief Justice Vinson stated:
"The Supreme Court is not, and never has been, primarily concerned with the cor-
rection of errors in lower court decisions. In almost all cases within the Court's appellate
jurisdiction, the petitioner has already received one appellate review of his case ...
To remain effective, the Supreme Court must continue to decide only those cases which
present questions whose resolution will have immediate importance far beyond the
particular facts and parties involved." Vinson, Work of the U.S. Supreme Court, 12
TEXAS B.J. 551-52 (1949).
19. U.S. SuP. CT. R. 19(1)b.
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court should be expected to recognize the fact and grant certiorari.
The court of last resort for the ordinary case lacking great public
importance should be the intermediate appellate court.
The only cases in which it seems necessary to provide for appeal
as of right to the highest court are those cases in which the public
interest demands immediate finality. Since these cases are of public
importance and therefore the kind that the court would be likely
to take on certiorari, providing for direct appeals would add little to
the burden of the court and avoid the evils of multiple appeals. With
these ideas in mind, it is suggested that the following would appropri-
ately define the jurisdiction of the supreme court in a state with an
intermediate appellate court:20
(a) Appeals from a judgment of a District Court involving
(1) a federal or state constitutional question;
(2) the validity of a tax or assessment; or
(3) the right to hold public office
shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court. In all other cases, review by
the Supreme Court shall be bad only upon certiorari to the Court of Appeals.
(b) Except as provided in (a) appeal from the judgment of a District
Court shall be taken to the Court of Appeals.
Nonprofit Corporations-Definition
Every American jurisdiction gives special benefits' to nonprofit
corporations in recognition of the services they render society. Com-
plex legislation has grown up in many states, defining the nonprofit
corporation in a piecemeal and incomplete fashion. Several states
have no statutory definition;2 and many of the existing definitions are
expressed in such ambiguous terms that they are useless, leaving for
judicial determination the question of which associations can incor-
porate under the nonprofit corporation laws of that jurisdiction.3 In
20. The proposed statutory language uses "District Court" to designate the trial
court of general jurisdiction, "Court of Appeals" to designate the intermediate appellate
court, and "Supreme Court" to designate the highest court of the state.
1. Such benefits include exemption from corporate income tax at state and federal
levels, exemption in some incidences from ad valorem and franchise taxes, and a loose
corporate form.
2. See DE-L. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (1953); H-IvvAsI REy. LAWs § 173-40 (1955); KAN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 17-2504 (1949); MD. ANN. CODE art. 23 (1957); N.H. REv. STAT.
ANN. §§ 292-96 (1955); OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1.3 (1951); S.C. CODE §§ 11.13-
.19 (1939); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11 (1958); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 3014 (1961).
3. For a discussion of judicial determination, see Note, Judicial Approval as a
Prerequisite to Incorporation of Non-Profit Organizations in New York and Pennsylvanta,
55 COLUm. L. REv. 380 (1955).
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consequence, an association seeking the benefit of the nonprofit
corporation laws of a state often has little guidance as to whether it
qualifies as such a corporation. Also, since the definitions used in
different jurisdictions are inconsistent, a nonprofit association which
is incorporated in one state may not be able to qualify under the
nonprofit provisions of another jurisdiction in which it desires in-
corporation.4 Some of the problems caused by the nonexistence, am-
biguity, and inconsistency of the statutory definitions of the nonprofit
corporation would be resolved by the enactment of a definition which
concisely expresses a determination by the legislature as to what groups
will be allowed nonprofit incorporation in that jurisdiction.
Two general approaches have been used in drafting statutes to
solve these problems. One is a functional approach that enumerates
the permissible purposes and activities of a nonprofit corporation. The
other is an economic approach which makes the right of nonprofit
incorporation depend on the economic relationship between the
corporation and its members.5 A state legislature that uses the func-
tional approach must compile a list of acceptable purposes for non-
profit corporations, and in order to incorporate under these statutes,
an organization must fit its purpose into one of the enumerated cate-
gories. Common classifications under this type of statute are benevol-
ent and charitable, social, recreational, trade and professional,
educational, cultural, civic, religious, and scientific.6 The functional
approach, however, has various shortcomings. Since the state legisla-
ture must determine the acceptable purposes of a nonprofit corpora-
tion, there are unjustifiable omissions in the individual statutes and
thus a lack of uniformity among the jurisdictions.7  The permitted
purposes, moreover, are often ambiguous." Also, because these
enumerations are based on a judgment of the worthiness of the possible
purposes, they tend to become outmoded as social values change.'
A definition based on the economic approach, on the other hand,
4. E.g., in Tennessee, social clubs can incorporate under the nonprofit corporation
provisions; in Mississippi, they cannot. Miss. CODE ANN. § 5310.1 (Supp. 1962); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 48-1101 (6) (1955).
5. Note, Permissible Purposes for Nonprofit Corporations, 51 CoLIJm. L. REv. 889
(1951).
6. Id. at 891-92.
7. See, e.g., statutes cited note 4 supra.
8. Some state statutes include provisions similar to the following: "Organizations or
other associations organized for the promotion of literature, education, science or art,
or any other association organized for the promotion of bodily or mental health, and all
other organizations organized to promote either or all of the above named objects."
TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1101(12) (Supp. 1963).
9. E.g., in Tennessee, debating societies and societies for the organization and
support of battleground associations can become nonprofit corporations. TENN. CODE
ANN. § 48-1101 (1955).
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defines a nonprofit corporation as one which is organized for any
purpose other than bestowing pecuniary gain or profit on its mem-
bers. This connotive type of definition is superior since it is directed
at the fundamental nature of the organization rather than merely
enumerating organizations of this nature. Also it eliminates unjustifia-
ble omissions and the possibility of social antiquation, and, ff widely
adopted, it would further uniformity among the states.
The primary problem encountered in using the economic approach
is the ambiguity of the word "profit." The view accepted by a majority
of the courts defines profits as dividends or any other direct return
on an investment;10 profit must be tangible, something of value that
the member receives directly from the corporation." In contrast, the
minority view considers profit to be any possible pecuniary benefit,
even though indirect.'2 The first view, of course, makes the coverage
of a nonprofit statute very broad-any organization which does not dis-
tribute directly to its members a return on their investment will fall
within the scope of the statute. The ABA-ALI Model Nonprofit Cor-
poration Act [hereinafter referred to as the Model Act], enacted in
several jurisdictions,' 3 adopts this first view by defining the nonprofit
corporation as "a corporation no part of the income of which is dis-
tributable to its members, directors or officers."14 Legislation that
takes the more limited positionhas been enacted in Pennsylvania:
"'Nonprofit Corporation' means a corporation organized for a purpose
or purposes not involving pecuniary profit, incidental or otherwise, to
its members."'5 Under this statute, any organization the purpose of
which is to even indirectly affect the earnings of its members is ex-
cluded from nonprofit incorporation.16 The interpretation of both
types of statutes would, of course, include the organizations which are
10. See Southland ex rel. Snider v. Decimo Club, Inc., 16 Del. Ch. 183, 142 At]. 786
(1928); Read v. Tidewater Coal Exch., Inc., 13 Del. Ch. 195, 116 Ati. 898 (1922);
Snyder v. Chamber of Commerce, 53 Ohio St. 1, 41 N.E. 33 (1895).
11. Read v. Tidewater Coal Exch., Inc., supra note 10, at 904.
12. See Hebeler's Appeal, 296 Pa. 431, 146 At. 26 (1929); Krassen-Luber Family
Circle Foundation, 71 Pa. D. & C. 353 (C.P. 1950); In re Automatic Phonograph
Owners Ass'n, 45 Pa. D. & C. 165 (C.P. 1938); In re Fayette Gasoline Retailers Ass'n,
32 Pa. D. & C. 165 (C.P. 1938).
13. The definitional sections are: AI. CODE tit. 10, § 204 (1958); CONN. GEN.
STAT. REv. § 33-421 (1961); D.C. CoDE ANN. § 29-1002 (Supp. II 1963); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 617.012 (Supp. 1962); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 163 (Smith-Hurd 1954); Nnn.
REv. STAT. § 21-1901 (Supp. 1961); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-24-02 (1960); OnE. Rxv.
STAT. § 61.011 (1961); TEx. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 1396-1.02 (1962); UTaI CODE
ANN. § 16-6-19 (Supp. 1963); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 181.02 (1957).
14. ABA-ALI MODEL NoNPROFrr Cori,. ACT § 2 (1957). For similar definitions, see
model codes proposed in BoYER, NONPRoFI COR'OaArON STATUTES 151 (1957);
OLECK, NoN-PRoFrr COnROin ONs mD AssocrAoNs 419 (1956).
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 2851-52 (1958).
16. In re Fayette Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, supra note 12.
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always considered nonprofit groups, such as churches, charities, hos-
pitals, schools, clubs, and similar organizations. Two types of organi-
zations, however, receive different treatment under each of these
statutes.
The first type receiving diverse treatment is the organization that
benefits its members by gaining for them reduced prices for goods
and services, such as an association formed to secure for its members
at cost the benefits of home ownership17 or one organized to provide
inexpensive medical care for its members.' 8  The direct benefit ap-
proach includes such an association as a nonprofit corporation since in-
come is not distributed to its members. 19 On the other hand, the
indirect benefit approach considers the saving of expense to be a
pecuniary benefit and thus excludes such organizations from nonprofit
incorporation.' Such organizations, however, show a distinct simi-
larity to cooperative associations. If the organization "furnishes an
economic service without entrepreneur or capital profit and is owned
and controlled on a substantially equal basis by those for whom the
association is rendering service,"21 it should be incorporated under the
cooperative association laws of the jurisdiction rather than the non-
profit corporation laws. When an association has the characteristics of
a cooperative,2 it does not qualify for nonprofit incorporation under
the Pennsylvania statute;2 and if it meets the local definition of a co-
operative, it is specifically excluded from Model Act coverage.24 Since
17. See State ex rel. Russell v. Sweeney, 153 Ohio St. 66, 91 N.E.2d 13 (1950), 12
OrMo ST. L.J. 138 (1951).
18. See State ex rel. Troy v. Lumbermen's Clinic, 186 Wash. 384, 58 P.2d 812
(1936).
19. Read v. Tidewater Coal Exch., Inc., supra note 10; Associated Hosp. Serv., Inc. v.
City of Milwaukee, 13 Wis. 2d 447, 109 N.W.2d 271 (1961).
20. State ex rel. Russell v. Sweeney, supra note 17; State ex rel. Troy v. Lumbermen's
Clinic, supra note 18.
21. PACKEL, Tim ORGANIZATION AND OPERATION OF CooPERATIVES 3 (2d ed. 1947).
See American Box Shook Export Ass'n v. Commissioner, 156 F.2d 629 (9th cir. 1946).
22. The following general criteria for qualification as a cooperative have been sug-
gested: "(1) [C]ontrol of each of the associates over the management of the association
is substantially equal; (2) ownership interests of each of the associates are substantially
equal; (3) associates are limited to those who will avail themselves of the services
furnished by the association; (4) transfer of the ownership interests is prohibited or
limited; (5) capital investment receives no return or a limited return; (6) economic
benefits pass to the associates on a substantially equal basis or on the basis of their
patronage of the association; (7) death, bankruptcy or withdrawal of one or more
associates does not terminate the association; and (8) services of the association are
furnished primarily for the use of the associates." PACKEL, op. cit. supra note 21, at 4.
(Footnote omitted.)
23. See note 20 supra. As a cooperative, however, the association may receive some
of the same benefits as a nonprofit corporation. For a survey of the federal tax implica-
tions of cooperation, see Jensen, The Federal Income Tax Status of Nonexempt
Cooperatives, 6 UTAH L. REV. 23 (1959).
24. "[L]abor unions, cooperative organizations, and organizations subject to any
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many states provide only for the incorporation of certain types of co-
operatives,2 it may be argued that it would be improper to deprive
other types of cooperatives special treatment. Nevertheless, the pecuni-
ary benefit bestowed on the members of such an organization is readily
demonstrable; 26 and a saving is no less a profit than the same amount
given to the member as a dividend. Cooperatives are recognized as
business associations formed to give their members pecuniary bene-
fits.2 7 Consequently, any similar organization, although it might not
qualify as a cooperative under the statutes of the jurisdiction, would
be a business association whose primary purpose is to bestow definite,
though indirect, pecuniary benefits on its members, and should be ex-
cluded from nonprofit incorporation. If special treatment is desired
for such associations, the proper remedy would be expansion of the
cooperative association laws of the jurisdiction.18
The other type of organization receiving different treatment is the
commercial association commonly referred to as a trade association.
Such organizations are of two types: (1) those formed to promote
business generally by emphasizing public service or attempting to
stimulate good will among or toward businessmen, such as the
Chamber of Commerce; and (2) organizations "made up of business
competitors whose aim is to work together, within the limits of the
antitrust laws, to advance their economic interests. '29 The activities
of the latter include statistical reporting services, distribution of price
information, standardization and simplification of products, lobbying,
and technical research.30 Such organizations are permitted nonprofit
of the provisions of the insurance laws of this State may not be organized under this
Act." ABA-ALI MODEL NoNPRoFrr CORP. AcT § 4 (1957).
25. E.g., Tennessee allows the incorporation of only three types of cooperatives:
agricultural cooperative marketing associations, mutual life insurance companies, and
electric cooperatives. TErNN. CODE ANN. §§ 43-1812, 56-1801, 65-2503 (1955).
26. The following table shows the percentage of savings to members of cooperatives
and cooperative supermarkets from 1953 through 1959:
Year 33 Coops 20 Coops With Supermarkets








VooRms, A mUcAN COOPERATivES 165 (1961).
27. "All of the cooperative association acts of the several states authorize incorporation
only for furthering business purposes of the associated members. Cooperatives are
definitely a part of the business enterprise operations of their member-patrons."
JENsEN, COOPERATrvE Com'osAm AsSOCIAION LAW AND AcCOUNTING 76 (1950).
28. This topic will be treated in a forthcoming issue of this law review.
29. LAMB & KrrTELLE, TRADE AssocIAToN LAW AND PRAcrxcE § 1.1, at 4 (1956).
30. See generally LAMB & KITTELLE, op. cit. supra note 29.
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incorporation under the Model Act.31 The reasons appear to be, first,
that any benefits received by the members of such associations are
too indirect to be considered profits, and second, that if these associa-
tions are not included, they have to incorporate under business cor-
poration provisions which require the issuance of stock and provide for
strict regulation of corporate affairs. Stock issuance is inappropriate
since trade associations usually depend on dues and assessments to
provide operating funds,m and they do not require strict regulation
since they usually do not have stockholders whose investments require
protection. The tax consequences of either inclusion or exclusion
generally do not appear great. Although, as in the case of nonprofit
corporations, such associations might receive an exemption from
corporate income and franchise taxes, such benefits would have little
effect on trade associations since they usually earn no profit on which
they might be taxed. The form of incorporation, moreover, will not
affect a trade association's federal tax exemption if the purposes section
of the articles of incorporation is properly drafted.33 The Pennsylvania
view, on the other hand, holds that a trade association is a business
for profit, since its objective is to enhance the pecuniary position of
its members and not to promote any social, educational, religious,
fraternal, or other like cause.3 The latter requirement is a judicial
addition to the statutory definition. These pecuniary benefits which
inure to the members, however, are so indirect that they are practically
impossible to determine; and to require trade associations to operate
under the restrictions of a business corporation act would be an un-
justifiable hardship since their nature is similar to that of the nonprofit
corporation.
In consequence, a definition of the nonprofit corporation should in-
clude trade associations while excluding those organizations which are
similar to cooperatives. Profit to the members of an organization,
therefore, can be either a distribution of income by that organization
31. "Corporations may be organized under this Act for any lawful purpose or pur-
poses, including, without being limited to, any one or more of the following purposes:
. .. professional, commercial, industrial or trade association ..... ABA-ALI MODEL
NONPROFIT CORP. AcT § 4 (1957).
32. LAMB & KITTELLE, op. cit. supra note 29, §§ 13.12.13.
33. The exemption includes "business leagues, chambers of commerce, real-estate
boards, or boards of trade, not organized for profit and no part of the net earnings of
which inure to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual." INT. REV. CODE OF
1954, § 501(c)(6). A "business league" is defined as "an association of persons having
some common business interest, the purpose of which is to promote such common in-
terest and not to engage in a regular business of a kind ordinarily carried on for
profit." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(6)-1 (1958). See LAmB & KITTELLE, op. cit. supra
note 29, § 17.3.




or any tangible pecuniary benefit derived from the activity of the
organization, whether it be buying goods or services for the members
or selling the goods or services of the members. If a comprehensive
act regulating cooperatives existed in the jurisdiction, organizations
giving rise to this less direct kind of profit could be excluded merely by
specific reference to cooperatives. Certain exceptions to this rule exist,
however. First, the corporation must be able to compensate any
members in its employment; 5 and, second, it should be capable of
distributing certain parts of its assets to its members on dissolution
or liquidation.3 6 The following definition of the nonprofit corporation,
embodying these two manners in which profit is derived and the ex-
ceptions, should aid in solution of the problems existing under present
legislation:
(a) A "Nonprofit Corporation" is a corporation no part of the income of
which is distributable to its members, directors, or officers, and the members,
directors, or officers of which are not permitted to receive tangible benefit
arising from common or centralized purchasing or selling of goods or services
for the members.
(b) The following will not prevent qualification as a nonprofit corporation:
(1) the payment of reasonable compensation for services rendered, or
(2) the making of distribution upon dissolution or final liquidation
as permitted in this chapter.
(c) Organizations subject to the insurance laws of this State may not be
organized under this act.
35. This exception is included in the statutory definition enacted in five jurisdictions.
See CONN. GEN. STAT. Rv. § 33-421(k) (1961); D.C. CODE ANN. § 29-1002 (Supp. II
1963); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, § 163 (Smith-Hurd 1954); LA. REv. STAT. § 12,101
(1950); Omo Rzv. CODE ANN. § 1702(c) (Baldwin 1963).
36. The definitions enacted in all the jurisdictions enumerated in note 35 supra, except
Louisiana, include this exception. The act should limit the distribution of assets to a
member on dissolution or liquidation to the amount which he has contributed to the
corporation, in order to prevent abuse of the right of distribution. See ABA-ALI MODEL
NONPROFrr CORP. AcT § 46 (1957); OLEcIc, NoN-PitnoT Com, onAvroNs AND AssoCIA-
TIONS §§ 232-33 (1956). For the federal tax implications involved, see Treas. Reg. §
1.501(c)(3)-1(b)(4) (1954).
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